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• There is a significant divide between the European Union countries with the greatest
capacity to innovate, and those with the least capacity to innovate. The difficult
convergence process has been proceeding only very slowly and unevenly, and more
recently seems to have come to a halt.
• A particular weak spot for the EU is corporate investment in research; in this area, the
intra-EU divide is growing. As the business sector is responsible for the persistent R&D
intensity gap between the EU and the United States and Asia, the persistent failure of
lagging EU countries to catch up in this area provides much of the explanation for the
EU’s weak performance compared to other economies.
• The evidence shows that the deployment of public budgets and the mix of policies
employed by EU member states have tended to aggravate the intra-EU divide.
• The EU needs to better understand its growing internal innovation divide if it is to
achieve its ambition of becoming a world innovation leader.
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1. For a more detailed
description of the indica-
tors, see veugelers (2015).
2. To measure the variation
in EU member states’ inno-
vation capacity, we use the
coefficient of variation, also
labelled as the σ-coefficient
= (√vAR/mEAn).
1  InTRODUCTIOn
The European Union’s lofty ambition is that its
growth should be socially and environmentally
sustainable and its future prosperity should be
built on foundations of innovation. But ambition
has so far not translated into leading performance.
According to the European Commission’s 2015
Innovation Union Scoreboard indicator (IUS), a
composite indicator developed to assess innova-
tion performance, Europe is not doing well. The EU’s
IUS score is only 81 percent of that of the United
States. For the moment, Europe still has a sub-
stantial lead over emerging markets. But China,
with an IUS score still half of the EU's, is catching
up fast. On private expenditure on research and
development, a key indicator to assess a nation’s
capacity for innovation, the EU is lagging signifi-
cantly. Its private R&D-to-gDP ratio is 57 percent of
the US level. In terms of public expenditure on R&D,
there is no gap between the EU and the US. But
Europe’s overall R&D-to-gDP-ratio continues to
stand at 2 percent, far from the EU's 3 percent
target and significantly lower than the US, Japan,
South Korea and Singapore. China has caught up
fast and in terms of overall R&D spending is
already on par with the EU.
This Policy Contribution examines the EU’s strug-
gle to improve its capacity for innovation, in par-
ticular the differences between EU member states
in terms of their capacity to innovate. Is the EU’s
failure to catch up a failure of its innovation-lead-
ing member states to defend and further improve
their leading positions? Or is it because its inno-
vation-lagging member states fail to catch up and
the EU has not closed the innovation divide
between its member countries?
we show a serious divide between EU member
states in terms of their capacity to innovate, with
convergence taking place only very slowly and
unevenly. more recently, the already-difficult con-
vergence process seems to have come to a halt.
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In terms of the innovation policies used by
member states, the evidence shows that the
deployment of public budgets and the mix of
instruments might have aggravated the divide.
2. ThE InnOvATIOn CAPACITY OF EU mEmBER
STATES: A gROwIng DIvIDE
The innovation capacity of nations measures their
ability to generate new ideas and to translate
them into economic growth and prosperity
(Furman et al, 2002). Because of differences in
initial conditions and because of differences in
how EU countries have sought to create innova-
tion-based growth, we can expect substantial dif-
ferences between European countries in terms of
innovation capacity. we would however expect
that the process of EU integration would allow lag-
ging countries to catch up faster, pushing conver-
gence within the EU in terms of innovation
capacity, along with economic convergence.
In order to assess countries’ innovation capaci-
ties, a range of factors needs to be explored. In
addition to the availability of R&D inputs, public
R&D infrastructure and financing, this includes the
linking of public and private bodies involved in
innovation, incentives for firms to innovate, and
the ability of firms to create and capture value
from their innovations on world markets (Furman
et al, 2002). To measure innovation capacity, we
use the Summary Innovation Index from the IUS.
This covers eight aspects of innovation capacity:
human resources, public research systems,
finance, investment by firms, linkages, intellec-
tual property rights, innovations and economic
effects1.  we measure the variation in innovation
capacity across the EU countries.   Convergence
occurs when the variation decreases over time.
The divide in innovation capacity measures the
gap between the best and worst performers within
a group of countries2.
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when looking within the EU at differences in IUS
performance (Table 1), the countries at the top are
Denmark, Finland, germany and Sweden, while
Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania sit at the bottom. The
gap between best and worst performer is signifi-
cant, illustrating the major differences in innova-
tion capacity between EU countries. Although the
gap decreased from 2006-13, reflecting a slow
process of convergence, it remains substantial.
Furthermore, the convergence process slowed
after 2008, coinciding with the start of the crisis.
There has been no convergence since 2010.
Table 1 shows that the innovation leaders have
progressively improved their IUS scores. All other
groups of countries have also improved their
scores, and at a faster rate than the innovation
leaders, as the shrinking gap scores show. This
illustrates a slow process of catching-up within the
EU. The innovation followers narrowed the gap the
most. The bottom group of modest innovators
caught up relatively rapidly between 2006 and
2008, but have lost momentum since.
The southern EU countries made considerable
progress in the pre-crisis period, but their process
of converging with the leaders has halted since
2008. In contrast, in the central and eastern Euro-
pean countries, catching up continued after 2008,
albeit at a reduced pace.
most of the central and eastern European and the
southern EU countries have been through signifi-
cant fiscal consolidation since 2008. There is a
serious innovation capacity gap between the
countries in high fiscal consolidation mode and
the innovation-leading countries (which are all
countries with low levels of fiscal consolidation).
This gap is only very slowly being bridged, with a
pace of convergence that slowed after 2008 and
stopped after 2010. 
Table 2 shows a similar breakdown of information
to Table 1, but for the eight components of the
Summary Innovation Index. It shows that the EU
has made on average substantial improvements
in terms of human resources and the public
research system (science), which used to be
weak spots. however, the EU remains weak on
investment by firms: for this component, the EU
average IUS score is lowest, and there is no sign
of improvement. On the contrary, performance has
Table 1: eu ius trends, selected country groups, 2006-13 
IUS score 2006 2008 2010 2013
Average EU 0.49 0.5 0.53 0.55
variation in innovation capacity * 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.35
Innovation leaders  (Denmark, Finland, germany,
Sweden
0.67 0.68 0.7 0.72
Performance relative to
innovation leaders (=100)
Innovation followers (nL, BE, UK, IE, AT, FR, LU, SI, EE,
CY)
76 79 79 81
moderate innovators (IT, CZ, ES, PT, EL, hU, SK, mT, hR,
LT, PL)
47 48 49 50
modest innovators (Lv, RO, BU): 27 31 33 30
CEE countries 42 44 45 46
Southern EU countries (EL,IT, ES, PT, CY, mT) 52 57 57 57
high ﬁscal consolidation countries 48 50 51 51
Source: Bruegel on the basis of IUS (2014). notes: The classiﬁcation of countries into innovation leaders, innovation fol-
lowers, moderate innovators and modest innovators follows IUS (2014) on the basis of the scoring of countries on the IUS
indicator. CEE countries = central and eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia ). high ﬁscal consolidation countries are countries judged to have
weak overall budgetary positions: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, greece, hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Spain. Scores for groups of countries are unweighted averages. * coeﬃcient of variation (see footnote 2).
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Table 2: The components of the ius: the divide in europe
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Average EU 2006 0.46 0.4 0.57 0.45 0.5 0.51 0.51 0.53
Average EU 2013 0.58 0.53 0.56 0.42 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.6
variation in innovation
capacity, 2006
0.32 0.64 0.49 0.35 0.46 0.65 0.51 0.36
variation in innovation
capacity, 2013
0.24 0.58 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.31
Innovation leaders, 2006 0.64 0.53 0.69 0.63 0.79 0.72 0.78 0.61
Innovation leaders, 2013 0.74 0.67 0.71 0.62 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.66
Performance relative to innovation leaders  (=100)
Innovation followers, 2006 83 86 72 75 74 59 79 85
Innovation followers, 2013 89 91 78 71 90 71 73 84
CEE, 2006 64 26 45 62 40 23 36 52
CEE, 2013 76 29 55 49 41 34 37 55
Southern EU countries,
2006
55 47 40 61 48 35 56 69
Southern EU countries,
2013
59 55 41 50 58 50 59 72
high ﬁscal consolidation
countries, 2006
64 41 43 64 45 29 46 58
high ﬁscal consolidation
countries, 2013
73 44 48 46 46 38 47 66
Source: Bruegel on the basis of IUS (2014). notes: Human resources includes three indicators and measures the availability
of a high skilled and educated workforce. The indicators capture: new doctorate graduates, population aged 30-34 with
completed tertiary education, and population aged 20-24 having completed at least upper secondary education. Open, excel-
lent and attractive public research systems includes three indicators and measures the international competitiveness of the
science base by focusing on the international scientiﬁc co-publications, most cited publications and non-EU doctorate
students. Finance and support includes two indicators and measures the availability of ﬁnance for innovation projects by
venture capital investments and the support of governments for research and innovation activities by R&D expenditures by
universities and government research organisations. Firm investments includes two indicators of both R&D and non-R&D
investments that ﬁrms make in order to generate innovation. Linkages includes three indicators measuring innovation capa-
bilities by looking at SmEs that innovate in-house and collaboration eﬀorts between innovating ﬁrms and research collabo-
ration between the private and public sector. Intellectual assets captures diﬀerent forms of intellectual property rights (IPR)
generated as a throughput in the innovation process including patent applications, community trademarks and community
designs. Innovators includes three indicators measuring the share of ﬁrms that have introduced innovations onto the market
or within their organisations, covering both technological and non-technological innovation and employment in fast-growing
ﬁrms of innovative sectors. Economic eﬀects includes ﬁve indicators and captures the economic success of innovation in
employment in knowledge-intensive activities, the contribution of medium and high-tech product exports to the trade balance,
exports of knowledge-intensive services, sales due to innovation activities and license and patent revenues from selling tech-
nologies abroad. For other details, see Table 1.
slipped. This area has persistently been Europe’s
weakest spot in terms of innovation capacity.
The inability of the EU to address its weak
performance in terms of investment by firms, rel-
ative to competing economies, correlates with an
increasing divergence between EU member states
in this area. In particular, the gap between the
innovation-leading countries and the innovation-
lagging countries in high fiscal consolidation
is growing.
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As it is the business sector that is responsible for
Europe’s persistent overall R&D intensity shortfall
relative to the US and Asia (veugelers and Cincera,
2010), the persistent failure of lagging EU coun-
tries to catch up in this area goes a long way to
explain the EU’s slowness to catch up with others
economies on this key indicator.
For the other components of the IUS, the gap
between EU member states has decreased over
time. nevertheless, the gap remains large for
research systems. The greatest convergence is
measured for the human resources and economic
impact components. The latter is especially
encouraging, because its shows that countries
can catch up in terms of the economic benefits
from innovation even when not catching up on all
components of innovation capacity.
when looking country-by-country, the innovation-
leading countries score high on all the compo-
nents of the IUS, reflecting the systemic nature of
well-performing innovation systems. They have
managed to increase their scores on human
resources and the public research system (sci-
ence) as enablers of innovation capacity. Invest-
ment by firms remains a challenge even for the
innovation-leading countries, which stand out
most clearly in terms of their capacity for linkage
and IP protection.
while the central and eastern European countries
have been catching up on most IUS components,
they have fallen further behind in terms of invest-
ment by firms. The gap also remains substantial
for linkages. But the biggest gap between the inno-
vation leaders  and the central and eastern Euro-
pean countries is for the public research system,
and this gap is only slowly closing.
For the southern EU countries, the largest gap with
the innovation leaders is for finance as an enabler,
with very little evidence of catching up. This could
have significant implications for their future
prospects because the southern EU countries are
also in high fiscal consolidation mode. Also on
investment by firms, the southern EU countries
have been losing ground relative to the innovation
leaders, similarly to the central and eastern Euro-
pean countries.
3.  ASSESSIng DIFFEREnCES BETwEEn
InnOvATIOn POLICIES In EU COUnTRIES
A country’s optimal innovation policy mix will
depend on its level of innovation capacity and
should dynamically evolve along with, and drive,
its development path. Differences in innovation
policies deployed by EU countries should there-
fore be expected, in line with the differences in
their innovation capacities. There is no one-EU-
size-fits-all optimal innovation policy prescription.
To close the innovation-capacity divide in the EU,
sufficiently differentiated innovation policies in
member states, which are tailored to address each
country’s specific innovation capacity position,
are needed.
In this section we assess the research and inno-
vation policies that EU countries have in place: do
they differ and do the differences reflect the dif-
ferences in countries’ innovation capacities? Can
the innovation policies that are in place address
the growing innovation-capacity divide between
EU countries?
we will consider: (i) how much public money is
spent on research and innovation; and (ii) how the
public funds are spent, ie what instruments are
deployed and with how much money. For public
funds, we use the information provided in the gov-
ernment budget appropriations or outlays for
research and development (gBAORD) data,
reported yearly by Eurostat. For individual instru-
ments, we use the TrendChart database3. we con-
sider only innovation policies at member state
level, ignoring the EU level.
3.1 A growing divide in public spending on
research and innovation (R&I) in Europe
Table 3 shows gBAORD as a percentage of gDP for
the EU as a whole. It shows first that public spend-
ing on R&I is in general very low in Europe, but is
gradually increasing. This increase was most pro-
nounced in the pre-2008 period; the increase
slowed markedly after 2008 and there has been
no increase since 2010.
There are significant differences in the amounts
spent by EU member states. These differences in
public spending (relative to gDP) are closely
3. Trendchart includes pro-
gramme-based research
and innovation but not
institutional funding. It
therefore only captures
active innovation policy,
but not the regular funding
of institutions, which also
strongly affects innovation
performance. For this
reason, we switch to
gBAORD rather than Trend-
Chart for data on public
expenditure and only use
the TrendChart database
when discussing policy
instruments. gBAORD data
does not include the tax
instrument. See veugelers
(2015) for more on both
databases.
4. See veugelers (2014) for
more analysis on the grow-
ing divide in public innova-
tion spending in Europe.
See also European Commis-
sion (2016).
5. For a more detailed
description of the innova-
tion policy instruments as
reported in Trendchart, see
veugelers (2015).
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between EU countries in terms of public R&I
spending have increased since the crisis, not only
because of an increasing divide between fiscally
stronger innovation-leading countries and fiscally
weaker innovation laggards, but also because of
a bigger divide within the group of fiscally weaker
innovation laggards. For example, while Portugal
and Spain scored similarly in 2006 (with 0.67 per-
cent of gDP spent on R&I), Portugal has managed
to safeguard its public R&D spending relative to
gDP better than Spain, leaving a ratio of 0.93 per-
cent in 2013 for Portugal versus only 0.54 percent
for Spain in 2013.
3.2 Innovation policy instruments used in
Europe
Beyond the size of the public budget spent on R&I
(relative to gDP), it also matters on which compo-
nents of innovation capacity the budget is being
spent. Table 4 shows the most important innova-
tion policy instruments over the period 1990-
2013 in EU member states, in terms of share of
total funding reported by Trendchart5.
Together the six instruments reported in Table 4
account for 70 percent of the R&I budget outlays
related to the positions of countries in terms of
their innovation capacity (as measured by IUS).
Innovation-leading countries spend more than
innovation followers, which in turn spend more
than moderate innovators. modest innovators
spend the least. viewing public spending as a
policy instrument for catching up, one would have
expected more of an inverted relationship, with
spending on R&I (as a share of gDP) to be more
prominent in the countries that are catching up.
while there was catching up by innovation follow-
ers, moderate and modest innovators before
2008, this stopped after 2008 and even went into
reverse, leaving a bigger divide in public spending
on innovation in 2013 than in 20064. This stalled
catching up and further falling behind is evident
for the central and eastern European countries but
even more so for the southern EU countries.
high fiscal consolidation countries show on aver-
age a pattern of stalled catching up and further
falling behind after 2008 compared to the inno-
vation leaders. however, there has been at the
same time a growing gap after 2008 between the
best and worst performers among the high fiscal
consolidation countries. hence, the differences
Table 3: diﬀerences in public r&i spending within europe (gBOard)
GBOARD as % of GDP 2006 2008 2010 2013
Average EU 0.51 0.56 0.58 0.58
variation in Public R&I spending *  0.41 0.37 0.41 0.42
Innovation leaders (Finland, Sweden,
Denmark, germany)
0.8 0.82 0.94 0.94
Performance relative to
innovation leaders (=100)
Innovation followers 68 73 68 66
moderate innovators 54 60 55 56
modest innovators 36 39 25 21
CEE countries 48 52 47 48
Southern EU countries 56 65 58 55
high ﬁscal consolidation countries 52 59 52 50
variation within high ﬁscal consolidation
countries* 
0.37 0.38 0.45 0.42
variation within low ﬁscal consolidation
countries*
0.36 0.33 0.34 0.35
Source: Bruegel on the basis of Eurostat (2014). notes: See Table 1 for country groups. * coeﬃcient of variation; see footnote 2.
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in the EU, as reported by TrendChart. This six-pack
of innovation policy instruments makes up the
bulk of the reported spend in all EU countries, irre-
spective of their innovation performance: 76 per-
cent for innovation leaders, 71 percent for
innovation followers, 64 percent for moderate
innovators and 70 percent for modest innovators
(see veugelers, 2015). The biggest gap between
EU member states within this six-pack of instru-
ments is for the use of loans and tax instruments.
we group all the innovation policy instruments
reported in TrendChart into five areas:
• Skills: support for human resources for R&D;
innovation skills development;
• Support for public R&D: R&D infrastructure:
competitive funding for research (for higher
education institutes and public research
organisations); centres of excellence; public
sector innovation;
• Support for firm R&I investment: tax incentives;
loans; direct business R&D support; direct
business innovation support; innovation support
services; support for start-ups; innovation
networks and platforms; innovation vouchers;
• Linkage support: incubators; technology
transfer; collaborative R&D programmes;
mobility schemes; science and technology
parks; cluster initiatives; spin-off support;
competence centres;
• Other: awareness raising; support for venture
capital; E-society; IPR measures; public
procurement; regional programmes.
(note: the six main instruments are underlined).
By grouping policies this way, we can more
closely overlay the innovation policy instruments
deployed by member states on their IUS scores
on the various components of innovation capac-
ity (Table 2).
Table 5 shows the share of public R&I spending
taken by each of these five areas for groups of EU
countries, using TrendChart data. The largest share
of EU countries’ spend goes to support firms’
investment in R&I (with various instruments), fol-
lowed by programmes to support public R&D
(excluding institutional funding) and programmes
to support linkages within the innovation system.
There are limited differences between member
states in the reported budget shares for support for
firm’s investments. In all groups of countries, these
instruments take up somewhat less than half of the
total public budget6. There are also limited differ-
ences between east and west, northern and south-
Table 4: major innovation policy instruments deployed in the EU
Major Instruments
Average share of total R&I 
budget reported by Trendchart
Variation between EU countries *
Funding for speciﬁc public research
programmes allocated in a competi-
tive manner to universities and
public research organisations
18.40% 1.01
measures to foster collaboration
between public organisations and
businesses, referred to as ‘collabo-
rative RDI programmes’
11.80% 1.36
Financial instruments (loans) 11.30% 1.89
Direct business innovation support 9.90% 1.05
Direct business R&D support 9.80% 1.12
Tax incentives 8.10% 1.72
Source: Bruegel on the basis of TrendChart. note: * coeﬃcient of variation in shares in total R&I budget; see footnote 2.
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6. The higher score for
moderate innovators is
because of greece, which is
recorded in TrendChart as
spending 96 percent of its
R&I budget on financial
instruments (loans).
into account the lower overall size of the budget
for public R&D support in central and eastern Euro-
pean countries (Table 3).
The innovation-leading countries stand out most
prominently in terms of the share of their reported
budgets that they devote to programmes to sup-
port linkages. Finland for instance spends 51 per-
cent of its R&I budget on collaborative R&D
programmes. ‘Linkages’ is also a component of the
IUS Summary Innovation Index, for which the inno-
vation-leading countries substantially out-perform
other EU countries. This is especially the case
compared to central and eastern European coun-
tries. For the central and eastern European coun-
tries, programmes that support linkages only
account for on average 8 percent of total reported
budgets. This relatively low deployment of instru-
ments to support linking can be related to the
weak performance of both the public and the pri-
vate R&I sector in these countries, especially the
poor quality of their public research systems
(Table 2). having effective public-private linkages
will require first increasing the quality of both
public and private research, before linking them.
For the category ‘other’, although it is small resid-
ual category in all groups of countries, there are
substantial differences between member states.
An outlier is Estonia, one of the innovation-follow-
ing central and eastern European countries. Esto-
nia reports spending 44 percent of its R&I budget
ern Europe, and between low and high fiscal con-
solidation countries. This relative homogeneity in
the deployment of this instrument is a mark of of
investment by firms being the weak spot for almost
all EU countries in their innovation capacity devel-
opment. nevertheless, as there is a substantial and
increasing gap between innovation leading and fol-
lowing countries in Europe, one might have
expected that greater emphasis would have been
put on this instrument by non-leading countries.
On programmes to support public R&D capacity
building, the results need to be handled with care
because the TrendChart data includes only com-
petitive funding programmes and does not include
institutional funding for research at public insti-
tutes. The relatively low spend in this area in the
four innovation-leading countries stands out. The
non-leading countries all spend a significantly
greater share of their budgets on competitive
funding programmes. The central and eastern
European countries spend the highest share of
their budget on this instrument. As Table 2 shows,
it is also for the IUS component of ‘open, excellent
and attractive research systems’ that there is a
huge and persistent gap between the central and
eastern European countries and the EU’s innova-
tion-leading countries. The somewhat higher
share of the budget spent on competitive funding
programmes for public R&D is definitely not com-
mensurate with the size of the gap that needs to
be bridged for these countries, particularly taking
Table 5: heterogeneity in the innovation policy instruments deployed in the eu
Share of reported  budget allocated to
Skills Public R&D Investment by ﬁrms Linkages Other
Average EU 5.50% 23.10% 47.70% 17.70% 4.20%
Average EU weighted 3.90% 14.10% 56.30% 21.40% 4.20%
Variation * 1.09 0.85 0.45 0.96 1.82
Innovation leaders 6.80% 7.00% 45.10% 37.50% 3.40%
Innovation followers 6.30% 23.10% 44.80% 16.80% 9.00%
moderate innovators 4.60% 23.30% 57.00% 11.60% 1.00%
modest innovators 6.10% 23.50% 47.40% 17.60% 5.90%
CEE countries 5.30% 29.00% 47.20% 8.00% 10.40%
Southern EU countries 4.50% 22.00% 51.40% 21.00% 1.20%
high ﬁscal consolidation 5.80% 19.60% 54.60% 14.70% 5.20%
Source: Bruegel on the basis of Trendchart. note: weights are the country’s reported budget reported by TrendChart. *
coeﬃcient of variation
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on support for venture capital, one of the other
instruments. This correlates with the star per-
formance of Estonia on the finance component of
the IUS indicator, for which Estonia has the high-
est score among all EU countries, even higher than
the innovation leaders.
Overall the analysis shows that the mix of instru-
ments for innovation policy deployed by EU
member states is a rather standard set of instru-
ments, with most countries deploying a similar
mix of bread-and-butter policy instruments,
focused mostly on supporting investment by
firms, irrespective of the innovation capacity
development level of the country
4.  mATChIng InnOvATIOn-POLICY DEPLOYmEnT
AnD InnOvATIOn-CAPACITY DEvELOPmEnT:
ThE CASE OF PROgRAmmES SUPPORTIng
InvESTmEnT BY FIRmS 
To better understand how differences in innova-
tion-policy deployment interact with differences
in performance on innovation capacity, we further
zoom in on the IUS component of investment by
firms in R&I. most EU countries concentrate their
reported R&I budgets on this area. It is also the
area for which Europe on average scores relatively
weakly compared to global competitors such as
the US. within the EU, it is the area most marked
by a high and persistent divide, in particular a con-
siderable gap between leading and lagging coun-
tries. however, as we have shown, despite this
divide in performance in this area, there is a
remarkable relative similarity in innovation policy
deployment.
In Figure 1 we examine whether countries that
score well in terms of investment by firms in R&I
also spend a large share of their public R&I budg-
ets (over the period 2004-12) on supporting
investment by firms in R&I (over the period 2006-
12). The intention is not to establish causation, but
to provide a bird’s eye view on correlation.
Figure 1 shows no clear correlation between
public spending and EU countries’ IUS scores in
terms of R&I investment by firms. The innovation-
leading countries are the best scoring EU coun-
tries on R&I investment by firms (together with
Slovenia and Estonia), but they spend a relatively
small part of their total reported budgets on sup-
port for investment by firms. The countries that
concentrate more of their innovation policy budg-
ets on stimulating investment by firms in R&I,
such as Poland, Lithuania, greece and hungary,
have relatively low performance scores in this
area. Overall, Figure 1 suggests that countries that
score weakest for R&I investment by firms spend
the most on supporting R&I investment by firms.
The converse also seems to be the case: those
that spend least perform best. This is suggestive
of the deployment of this group of instruments in
order to address country weaknesses.
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Figure 1: investment by ﬁrms in r&i and public spending on instruments to support investment by
ﬁrms: country scores 
Source: Bruegel on the basis of TrendChart and Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014 Database.
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But can any conclusions be drawn on whether the
deployment of larger spends to support R&I invest-
ment by firms is associated with improvements in
the performance of countries on this measure?
Figure 2 plots the average reported spend on R&I
investment by firms against the change in IUS
scores for that component over the period 2006-
12. Again it shows no clear pattern. Countries that
have consistently spent a substantial part of their
R&I budgets on investment by firms do not nec-
essarily consistently improve their scores for this
IUS component. Countries such as greece, Poland
and hungary are even regressing. A positive outlier
is the netherlands, which spends a consistent
large share of its reported R&I budget on support
for investment by firms, while managing to con-
siderably improve its IUS score for this measure.
Estonia has also managed to increase its IUS
score, but with only a small part of its budget allo-
cated to supporting investment by firms. This can
be correlated with its heavy emphasis on sup-
porting venture capital, as a complementary sup-
port scheme for firms to ease their financial
constraints when investing in R&I. This shows that
it is necessary to look at the whole mix of coun-
tries’ innovation policy instruments in order to
assess their impact on innovation performance.
5. SUmmARY AnD ImPLICATIOnS FOR POLICY
The challenges for innovation policy in Europe are
huge. The EU continues to suffer from an innova-
tion-capacity gap relative to other major world
economies, and the pace of catch-up is very slow.
The EU’s slow overall improvement in innovation
performance can be related to a growing innova-
tion-performance divide between its member
states. There are substantial differences between
EU member states in terms of their innovation
capacities. The divide between the innovation
leaders in the north and the innovation laggards
is proving very persistent. The process of conver-
gence, which was already very slow before 2008,
has since stalled, and has more recently moved
into reverse, especially in terms of the inability of
the southern EU countries to catch up.
Among the various components of innovation
capacity, Europe’s weakest spot is investment by
firms in R&I. This is also the innovation-capacity
component for which the divide between innova-
tion-leading and lagging member states increased
substantially between 2006 and 2013. As the
business sector is responsible for the persistent
R&D intensity gap between the EU and the US and
Asia, the persistent failure of lagging EU countries
to catch up in this area provides much of the
explanation for the EU’s slow pace of catching up
with other economies.
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Figure 2: public spending on instruments to support investment by ﬁrms and subsequent changes
in country scores on investment by ﬁrms in r&i
Source: Bruegel on the basis of TrendChart and Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014 Database.
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On the quality of the public research system,
despite overall EU improvement relative to the US,
the differences within the EU, despite slow con-
vergence, remain substantial. while excellence in
public research may always be more geographi-
cally concentrated – as it is in the US – what mat-
ters more is how this excellent research is shared
with the private sector, underpinning corporate
innovation. however, in terms of linkages between
the public and private sectors, the divide between
EU member states is substantial and has
increased over time.
The innovation divide is not a simple east-west
division. Estonia and Slovenia outperform other
central and eastern European countries. There is a
strong and even more persistent north-south
divide. while the central and eastern European
countries have caught up on most components of
innovation capacity, the gap between them and
the innovation leaders is widest in terms of the
quality of public research systems. This gap is
only slowly narrowing. For the southern EU coun-
tries, the biggest shortfall compared to the inno-
vation leaders is for finance as an enabler, with
very little catching up evident in this area.
Although all innovation-leading countries are in
low fiscal consolidation mode, and all countries in
high fiscal consolidation mode are innovation lag-
gards, the innovation divide is not a simple divide
between low and high fiscal consolidation coun-
tries, because there is also a growing divide
between high fiscal consolidation countries in
terms of innovation capacity performance.
Since the crisis, the divide between EU countries
in public spending on R&I relative to gDP has
increased. The innovation-leading countries have
forged ahead but the followers have not been able
to keep up, leaving a wider gap in public R&I
spending now than before the crisis. This is the
case for high fiscal consolidation innovation-lag-
ging countries, but even within this group there is
a growing divergence, with Portugal, for example,
improving while its neighbour Spain loses ground.
when looking at the various innovation policy
instruments deployed by EU countries, the evi-
dence shows that despite the wide and growing
divide in innovation capacity performance,
member states deploy a relatively similar mix of
policies. most EU member states dedicate the
major part of their resources to schemes to sup-
port investment by firms in R&I. The type of sup-
port that most differentiates innovation-leading
countries from other EU member states is their sig-
nificantly greater deployment of policy instru-
ments that support linkages in innovation
between the public and private sectors.
Overall, the innovation policies that have been
deployed do not seem to have been able to
address the growing innovation divide in the EU.
The evidence suggests that policy mixes are the
outcome of a variety of factors and only one of
these seems to be a country’s innovation capacity
level. Other factors might include policy fashions
and perceptions of one-size-fits-all approaches to
innovation policy. A risk for the EU might be loom-
ing in this respect. Exercises such as the prepara-
tion and comparison of national Reform
Programmes and the European Semester might
drive EU countries’ innovation policies too much
in the same direction (Todling and Trippl, 2005).
Innovation policy in EU countries with lower inno-
vation capacities, and that are in catch-up mode,
should not just be an imitation of practises in inno-
vation-leading countries. 
we have only looked at innovation policies
deployed by member states, which spend most of
public money that is available in the EU for R&I.
however, there is a complementary role for the EU
to help close the innovation divide. In terms of
budgets, horizon 2020, and perhaps even more
so the Structural and Investment Funds, can be
used to complement spending by member states,
especially in countries in high fiscal consolidation
mode. Beyond provision of public funding, the
Europe 2020 strategy and the European Semes-
ter exercises can provide a forum for improved
governance of the mix of innovation policy instru-
ments deployed by member states. while the EU
can provide a forum for exchange on innovation
policy, the adoption of policy instruments should
adapt to local requirements. The Europe 2020
strategy should not be thought of as a harmoni-
sation process.
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The lack of correlation between innovation policy
deployment and improvements in innovation
capacity (Figures 1 and 2) calls for a more in-
depth evaluation of innovation policy deployment
by EU member states, in order to better under-
stand how to tailor innovation policy mixes to local
needs. The way forward for improving innovation
policy in Europe is better analysis and diagnosis
to guide policy design ex ante, more experimen-
tation with new instruments and combinations of
instruments, and better evaluation ex post.
Only if the EU understands and addresses the fail-
ure of its lagging members to catch up and its
growing internal innovation divide, will it be able
to achieve its ambition of becoming a world inno-
vation leader. 
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